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Abstract— Amid the leading position of Morocco in terms 
of Corporate Governance compared to peer countries 
from the Middle East and Africa (MEA) region, a number 
of legislative and operational limitations still as of today 
impede the process of implementation of these practices 
[1]. 
This leads us to question the extent to which the large 
market capitalization firms have implemented these 
practices. Therefore, the present article aims to present 
the findings of a semi-directive qualitative research 
conducted on the 20 largest capitalizations of Casablanca 
Stock Exchange.  
We will attempt to contextualize the most widely used 
Corporate Governance scoring system (Institute of 
Shareholders Services)to the Moroccan context. 
We will, then, analyze the state of progress of the selected 
equity listed companies in terms best practices of 
corporate governance by comparing our findings dated as 
of 2017 with the last report of the Moroccan Institute of 
Directors (IMA) of 2012. 
Keywords—Corporate Governance, RM/ISS, Semi-
directive qualitative research, and Moroccan equity 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Morocco, the 3rd largest financial market and the 2nd   
most promising emerging economy in Africa, has 
underway  from early 1990’s a series of economic and 
regulatory reforms which has fostered, in 2008, to the 
establishment of the national code of corporate 
governance [2]. 
According to the ROSC report [3], the national code of 
corporate governance in Morocco complies with the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) principles in terms of shareholder 
rights, disclosure and the role of board of directors.This 
report acknowledges the initiatives of policy makers to 
update and modernize the legal and regulatory 
frameworks as well as to strengthen the enforcement 
structures such as the Moroccan Capital Markets 
Authority (AMMC) and the central bank (Bank 
AlMaghrib- - BAM). 
In 2012,the AutoritéMarocaine des Marchés de Capitaux 
(AMMC), the Moroccan Secutities Exchange 
Commission, has mandated the Moroccan Institute of 
Administrators (IMA) toconduct a survey regarding the 
application of best practices of corporate governance 
within publicly traded companies. This market survey is 
intended to be re-conducted every three years. However, 
the last report issued by this organization was as of 2012 
[4].  Thus, it seems interesting to investigate the state of 
play of best practices of corporate governance in the 
publically traded companies since the last report of IMA 
in 2012[4]. 
Consequently, our work attempts to answer the following 
questions: 
1. To which extent the international norms and more 
specifically the recommendations of Institutional 
Shareholders’ Services (ISS) are applicable to the 
Moroccan large market capitalizations? and, 
2. Did these companies improve their best practices since 
the last report of IMA in 2012?  
To this purpose, our article will be organized in three 
parts. The first part will tackle the literature on the best 
practices of corporate governance. The second part will 
present our exploratory qualitative study in terms 
methodology.  The last part will gauge the compliance to 
the international norms (ISS) as well as the state of 
progress of corporate governance within the large equity 
listed companies. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The main objective of corporate governance is to ‘govern’ 
the behavior of managers and align their decisions to the 
best interests of shareholders.  Thus, the act of 
‘governess’ underpins two functions: a “constraining” 
function  which is represented by the disciplinary 
paradigm of corporate governance  and an “enabling” 
educational function covered by the cognitive approach of 
governance[5]. 
According to VO and Phan[6], the literature review from 
relevant academic studies has indicated several common 
characteristics relative to corporate governance such as: 
1-board effectiveness; 2-the independence of audit 
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committee; 3-board compensation; and4-shareholder’s 
protection. 
A. Board effectiveness 
Emerged from the contractual theories of corporate 
governance, the board effectiveness depends on how well 
this latter performs its monitoring and strategic advisory 
roles [7] and [8]. These authors state that firms with audit 
committees and remuneration committees are related to 
higher performance. 
Chen et al. [9] argued that board characteristics such as 
composition and internal functioning are crucial to 
conceptualizing and determining board effectiveness 
based on the shareholder perspective.  
 
B. Audit committee 
A number of studies have found that companies with an 
audit committee, particularly when the committee is 
active and independent, have less chance for the 
occurrence of fraud and other irregularities in reporting 
[8].The recommendations of these researchersconsent on 
the importance of the independence and competence of 
the audit committee members. 
Moreover, Love [10] states that the audit committee 
should be permanent, independent, reporting directly to 
the board and having an advisory function with at least 
one member been independent and having expertise in 
accounting and/or auditing.  
 
C. Shareholders’ protection provisions 
Since shareholders exercise their power by voting for 
directors and on major corporate issues, experts focus on 
voting procedures in evaluating shareholder rights [11]. 
These rights, which refer to anti-director rights, measure 
how strongly the legal system favors minority 
shareholders against managers or dominant shareholders 
in the corporate decision making process, including the 
voting process namely: voting by correspondence, 
cumulative voting, right to challenge director’s decisions 
in courts, preemptive right to buy new issues of stock, and 
the share capital needed to call an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting [11]. 
 
D. Compensation of executives 
According to Affes [12], the fundamental dilemma of 
corporate governance is the imperfect alignment of 
incentives between shareholders and managers, which can 
lead to behaviors and decisions by managers that are not 
in the interests of the firm’s shareholders. This author 
refers to the pioneer work of Jensen and Meckling in 1976 
and states that when managers act in their own personal 
interest at the expense of shareholders, it results in agency 
costs for the firm’s owners, which reduces value of 
shareholders. Several authors [11] [12] [13] explainthat 
shareholders can use managerial incentives to help align 
the manager’s interests with those of shareholders. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Data collection 
Our study was carried out over a five months period (from 
October 2016 to February2017)in whichwe used as a 
primary method of data collection the interviewing 
techniques.  
Along with it, andto a limited extent, we also usedofficial 
market reports as a complementary source of information.  
An interview guide was elaborated to facilitate the 
process of data collection. The choice and development of 
semi-structured questions were justified and been based 
upon the literature review and the main recommendations 
of the ISS scoring metric. 
Most of interviews were mediated by telephone (12 out 
20) while the remaining were conducted face to face. 
Due to the sensitivity of the subject, no verbatim audios 
were allowed and all the data were collected from 
transcripts taken during the telephone/ face to face 
interviews. 
Our points of contact were the chief financial officers 
(CFO), control directors and the senior management of 
the selected companies. 
The selection of our sample of companies was purposive 
and criteria based. We selected 20 equity listed 
companies. Our selection was based on two criteria:large-
cap companies incorporating the FTSE CSE Morocco15 
index, and / or belonging to major international groups. 
Five sectors were represented in this study namely: 
financial sector (8 enterprises), real estate and 
construction (4 enterprises), energy and mining (2 
enterprises), telecommunication and new technologies (2 
enterprises) and retail and consumer products (4 
enterprises). 
The choice of equity listed companies was justified by the 
lenience of these latter to adopt and comply with the best 
practices of corporate governance, more stringent market 
regulations, and the availability of financial and corporate 
information.  
 
B. Data analysis 
Data analysis was based on a thematic conceptual 
framework developed as a part of our doctoral project.  
Data were analyzed using an iterative approach whereby 
transcripts were coded according to a thematic 
framework, allowing mechanisms and practices of 
corporate governance to emerge in our analysis in line 
with our literature review. 
Transcripts were analyzed using NVIVO software. 
Content analysis was predominantly used and in a lesser 
extent textual analysis was applied. 
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We also used a comparative analysis when assessing the 
degree of progress of the best practices of corporate 
governance in Moroccan large capitalizations between the 
periods of 2012 (report of IMA) and 2017 (findings of our 
study).  
IV. FINDINGS 
As reported earlier, we will underway two analyses. For 
the compliance analysis, we have chosen as an 
international reference the Corporate Governance 
Quotient (CGQ) which is the rating metric under the 
flagship of the Institute of Shareholder Services (ISS). As 
per the evolution analysis, we have chosen the ten 
criterions highlighted in the IMA report [4]. 
 
A. Compliance to the international norms (ISS 
standards)  
The CGQ scoring system classified the best practices of 
corporate governance in seven requirements namely: 1- 
board composition, 2- specialized committees, 3- 
shareholders’ protection provisions, 4- mandates policy, 
5- progressive practices, 6- audit committee and 7- 
compensation of directors. 
 
1. Board composition 
The independence and size of board of directors for 
Moroccan large capitalizations are merely in line with the 
recommendations of the ISS scoring metric.  
 
Interestingly,though the Article 39 of Law 17-95 on the 
joint stock companies along with the national code of 
corporate governancerequire the independence criteria but 
they do not impose the majority quota.  Understandably, 
the independence requirements are not fully met due to 
the overriding requirements the acting national code of 
corporate governance in Morocco. 
 
2. Specialized committees 
Only one third of our targeted companies have a 
specialized committee (e.g. the governance and 
nomination committee.) The remainder confirms that this 
function is carried out by the board of directors. 
The independence requirement as it is stated by the ISS 
metric is not met by any of the panel interviewed.  More 
importantly, the joint stock act and the national code of 
corporate governance do not require independence of 
such committee.  
 
3. Shareholders’ protection provisions 
The results of our study have shown that our entire 
sample of companies complies with these provisions 
except the postal voting which is not a market practice in 
Morocco.  
According to our respondents, the provisions of ISS 
converge with the Law 17-95 on the joint stock 
companies and the AMMC act related to the legal 
provisions of publically listed companies [15].  
 
4. Mandates policy 
Half of our panel confirms that their CEOs sit on other 
boards while no former CEO serves as a board member. 
On average, the CEO and senior management serve one to 
two other mandates on behalf of their respective 
companies which are in line with the ISS standards 
(CEOs must not sit in more than 5 other boards.) 
Interestingly, our respondents confirm to not control if 
their CEOs exercise other external/third party mandates.  
It is to mention also that the acting code as well as the 
joint stock act do not provision for the limit number of 
mandates of CEOs and senior management. 
 
5. Progressive practices 
The findings of our study point out a substantial 
divergence between the market practices and the ISS 
recommendations. The quasi majority of our panel does 
not comply with all of these norms.   
 
6. Audit committee 
As per the independence requirement, more than half of 
our panel(14 enterprises out of 20) confirms havinga 
distinct audit committee.Furthermore, the audit committee 
accounts on average half of its members as independent 
while the remaining members are the chief financial 
officers and the control directors.  
The lack of compliance in terms the independence criteria 
is justified by the provisions of Law 17-95 on the joint 
stock companies which require that the chief financial 
officer as well as the control director to be part of the 
audit committee[14]. 
 
The transparency of auditor policy is not met by any of 
our sample of enterprises. According to our respondents, 
this discrepancy is attributed to the fact that the acting 
regulatory framework does not require such practice [15]. 
 
7. Compensation of directors 
Though our panel is not fully compliant, more than half of 
our sample (13 enterprises out of 20) hasalready put in 
place a stock option plan for their executives.  According 
to our respondents, the stock option provision is optional 
and only applied in the financial sector companies 
affiliated to international groups. 
The approval of executive compensation by shareholders 
is been met by all our panel of interviewees in line with 
the provision of the Law 17-95 on the joint stock 
companies [14]. 
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The disclosure of the compensation of executives is not 
applied by any of our interviewed companies since no 
acting law imposes such practices. 
 
B. Evolution of best practices of corporate governance 
in Morocco  
In order to gauge the evolution of best practices of 
corporate governance in Morocco,   we refer to the  ten 
best practices  depicted in the IMA[4] namely: 1/ 
adoption of the national code of  corporate governance, 2- 
existence of a governance charter, 3/- separation between  
the functions of the Chairman and CEO, 4/- Independence 
of the board of directors, 5/ existence of specialized 
committees, 6/- assessment  of the governance committee 
7/- assessment of senior  management, 8/ disclosure of  
executives’ compensation,9/ existence of incitation/  stock 
option schemes and 10/ disclosing information about the 
best practices of corporate governance in the annual 
reports.  
 
1. Adoption of the national code of corporate 
governance (CNGE) 
According to the IMA survey [4], more than half of the 
companies reported referring to the national code of 
corporate governance.While in our study, we found that 
just one-third of our sample complies with this code.  
This difference can be attributed to the difference of the 
panel questioned as well as the amalgamation between 
complying (full conformity to all provision) and referring 
(partial conformity.)  
Thus, it is fair to conclude that equity listed companies 
have not improve their practices in terms of compliance to 
the CNGE[15]. 
 
2. Existence of a Corporate Governance Charter 
According to the IMA report, half of their surveyed 
sample has a code of good conduct or a charter of 
corporate governance. Our study reveals an improvement 
in terms of this practice attributed mostly to the financial 
sector which is abided to comply with the Circular BAM 
4 / W / 2014 issued by the Central Bank of Morocco 
provisioning internal control and governance measures of 
credit institutions. 
 
3. Separation between the functions of the Chairman 
and the CEO 
It should be noted that in Morocco the choice of mode of 
governance is left to the discretion of each company.  
The one tiered mode remains predominant by the majority 
of companies surveyed in both studies (only 5 out 20 
enterprises adoptthe dual mode).  
According to our respondents, Moroccan companies are 
reluctant to separate between the management and control 
functions which impede the development process of 
corporate governance in Morocco. 
 
4. Independence of the board of directors  
Our study depicts an amalgamation of understanding 
between the independence requirements as it is 
recommended by the international norms (ROSC and ISS) 
and the attribute of “non-executive” of the board members 
required by the National Code of Corporate Governance.  
 
According to the IMA survey, the non-executive directors 
represent on average more than two-thirds of the board 
members.  
Our study reveals a slight improvement during the past 
five years contributed by the compliance of the financial 
sector to the new provisions of BAM circular.We found 
that less than half of our panel (8 enterprises out of 20) 
has independent members in their board. The proportion 
of independent members does not exceed, on average, 
half of the board of their board.   
 
5. Existence of specialized committees 
Based upon the acting code and the AMMC circular, it is 
up to the discretion of the board of director to set and 
determine the structure of these committees. 
In other words, companies might either appoint members 
or can set up distinct structure for governance, audit and 
nomination committees.  
The IMA survey indicates that two-thirds of companies 
have specialized committees. We noted an improvement 
(16 out of 20 enterprises) in this practice attributed to the 
new circular of the Moroccan Central Bank (BAM) which 
requires from credit institutions to set up specialized 
committees namely: the Audit, nomination and 
governance committees. 
 
6. Assessment of the board of director 
The results of the IMA survey confirm that half of the 
companies surveyed have the work of their board of 
directors been assessed. According to our study, no 
improvement was observed in this practice as we 
observed the same results. 
 
7. Assessment of executives 
According to the IMA survey, more than half of the 
surveyed firms confirm evaluating the performance of 
their senior management through key performance 
indicators (KPI).  
We have observed, in our study of 2017, a solid 
improvement in this practice. The majority of our panel 
states that they are conducting an annual appraisal of their 
executives.  
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8. Disclosure of Executive Compensation Information 
Amid the regulatory framework in Morocco requiring 
compensation of senior management to be approved by 
shareholders, disclosing the compensation remains 
restrained to a very limited number of companies. This 
trend has not changed since the last report published by 
the IMA. The respondents in our study justify this fact by 
the sensitivity of the subject. 
 
9.  Existence of an incentive/stock option plan 
The results obtained from our study converge with the 
findings of the IMA survey in 2012. Only half of our 
panel confirms having a profit-sharing/ stock option 
plans.  
We noticed no significant improvement in that practice. 
Furthermore, only Financial and Real Estate and 
Construction sectors have stock option schemes for their 
executives. Interestingly, no company confirms disclosing 
the stock option plans in their annual reports. 
 
10. Reporting in the annual reports 
The results obtained in our study converge with the 
findings of the IMA survey in 2012. More than half of our 
respondents confirm communicating information about 
their best practices of corporate governance in the annual 
reports. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
To sum up, the evolution of best practices of corporate 
governance in Morocco remains restricted and even 
stagnant despite several initiatives taken by the market 
authorities to mention the latest the circular of BAM 4 / 
W / 2014.  
We have raised a salient fact from this study. The 
implementation of best practices of corporate governance, 
with the exception of the financial sector, has not yet 
reached the regulatory stage and the code is still adopted 
on the basis of voluntary and non-binding membership. 
Moreover, the outcomes of our research reveal that the 
financial and the real estate and construction sectors are 
the most conforming to the best practices of corporate 
governance. This fact is explained by the structure of the 
ownership which is predominantly institutional (local 
institutional investors or international groups).  
On a global outlook, limits are as of today still persisting 
on what a code and even a “hard law” can achieve: 
cohesive regulatory frameworks have proven their limits 
in more than one advanced and market-oriented economy. 
Emphasis perhaps should be drawn to more innovative 
venues to enforce the corporate governance codes which 
could be a future development for this existing article. 
 
 
VI. LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS OF 
THIS STUDY 
In this study, we used rigorous data collection and 
analysis methods to promote the validity of the results. 
However, the results presented in this study were obtained 
from voluntary responses of respondents,which are 
discretionary to their judgments, perceptions, and the 
practices applied within their respective companies. 
Our research was marked by a number of constraints such 
as the difficulty in establishing direct access with 
respondents, the limited size of our sample, the 
confidentiality and sensitivity of certain information and 
the time constraint.  
As a result, we took recourse of complementary sources 
of information such as the annual reports of companies 
and the laws and circulars in force.  
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